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Abstract: 
Nihilism is one of Nietzsche’s foremost philosophical concerns. But characterizing it 
proves elusive. His nihilists include those in despair in the wake of the “death of God.” Yet they 
also include believing Christians. We have, among these nihilists, those fervently committed to 
frameworks  of  cosmic  meaning.  But  we  also  have  those  who lack  any  such  commitment, 
epitomized in the “last man.” We have those who want to escape this life. And we have those 
who  wouldn’t  dream of  such  a  prospect.  Extant  accounts  have  shed  helpful  light  on  the 
particularities of these various manifestations of nihilism. Yet they have not explained what 
ties  these together.  In this  paper,  I  propose a unifying thread.  Nihilists,  on my reading of 
Nietzsche, are those who have come unmoored from (what he sees as) the most important 
values.  That  is  not  to  say  that  there  is  nothing  more  to  nihilism than  being  wrong  (by 
Nietzsche’s lights). But it is to say that we don’t understand Nietzschean nihilism fully if we 
just  focus  on  the  descriptive  psychology  of  valuers.  The  unifying  thread  of  Nietzschean 
nihilism, on my reading, in fact turns out to be structurally similar to the familiar idea of it we 
get  in  a  number  of  other  19th  century  thinkers  and  authors—and  ironically  with  those 
moralists who brand Nietzsche himself a nihilist. Where he diﬀers from them is not in his 
account of what nihilism fundamentally is  (i.e.,  coming unmoored from values),  but in the 
values he sees nihilists as having come unmoored from. 
I. Introduction
Nietzsche,  it  is  widely agreed,  regards nihilism as a troubling problem, and there is 
further consensus that it is one of his main philosophical concerns. In a tradition stretching 
back at least to Heidegger, nihilism has long been discussed by interpreters of Nietzsche. But it 
has become a greater focus of attention of late in anglophone Nietzsche studies, following on 
Bernard  Reginster’s  groundbreaking  book  The  Aﬃrmation  of  Life:  Nietzsche  on  Overcoming 
Nihilism.  In the decade or so since that book appeared, a number of interpreters have tried to 1
work out further exactly what nihilism amounts to, some supplementing, some challenging the 
basic picture centered around the notions of disorientation and despair that Reginster put 
forward. 
  Reginster (2006). There were of course many treatments of nihilism before Reginster’s, and a number of 1
anglophone philosophers discussed it as well, for example, Schacht (1973); Magnus (1979); Nehamas (1985); Clark 
(1990); Richardson (1996); May (1999); White (2000). But it is in Reginster’s book that it is most explicitly 
thematized and treated at book length, and dissected and categorized in a way that it previously hadn’t been. 
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The basic interpretive challenge comes from the diversity of characters that Nietzsche 
thinks of as nihilistic.  Nihilists,  antecedently,  might seem to be those who, in the wake of 
God’s death, have lost their sense that anything matters and fallen into existential despair. But 
for Nietzsche, Christianity itself is also thoroughly nihilistic outlook (TI, 21; A, 20; A, 58; EH, 
“Why I Write Such Good Books,” 1; EH, “BT,” 2 ). So one manifestation of nihilism is to see 
the  world  as  bereft  of  God and accordingly  meaningless.  Another,  seemingly  diametrically 
opposed, is to see the world as guided by God and accordingly meaningful. Or take another 
example: It might seem that nihilists condemn the world and want to escape it. This is true of 
the  Schopenhauerian,  the  Buddhist,  and  perhaps  the  Christian.  But  what  of  the  “last 
man,” (TSZ, “Prologue”) utterly satisfied with the comforts of the world and with no aspiration 
or feeling for anything higher? Although not called a “nihilist” by name, it is often thought that 
we are supposed to regard him as the nadir of this condition.  2
Faced  with  these  seemingly  quite  diﬀerent  things  being  labelled  as  “nihilism,”  one 
strategy is just to say that there are diﬀerent forms of nihilism that Nietzsche identifies.  In 3
one respect,  this  seems evidently correct,  in that this  broad condition comes in a striking 
variety of  guises.  Yet as  I  shall  be arguing in this  paper,  there is  a  unifying thread linking 
together the main forms of nihilism he targets. Nihilism, on his view, is not just a pressing 
psychological predicament, though it does take that form. It is also, to varying degrees, an 
ethical failing. Nihilism, on the view I elaborate here, involves one’s being unmoored from an 
important  swath of  the valuable  and thus failing to value it.  (With the charge of  nihilism 
coming  from Nietzsche’s  mouth  then,  the  “valuable”  will  of  course  be  as  seen  from the 
standpoint of a Nietzschean ethics. ) This failure can happen both at the reflective cognitive 4
level,  but  also  at  the  emotive  or  aﬀective  level.  Nihilism,  on Nietzsche’s  way  of  thinking, 
 Pippin (2010); Katsafanas (2015); Gemes (Forthcoming). 2
 As acknowledged in various ways in Reginster (2006); Hussain (2007); Katsafanas (2015); Gemes (Forthcoming). 3
 This is not presupposing an ambitious meta-ethical construal. Everything I say would be compatible with 4
Nietzsche as an anti-realist or expressivist or similar at the meta-ethical level. All that is required is the idea that 
Nietzsche has first-order normative ethical and evaluative commitments, which he evidently does have.
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involves a failure of attraction and attachment to certain important values: this life and world 
most notably, but particularly the features that make this life and world good, but which it can 
be a challenge to value in a full-blooded way: its inevitably transitory character, exercises of the 
will  to  power,  experiences  of  struggle  and  striving.  In  extreme  cases,  nihilism  involves 
indiﬀerence even to exceptional human excellence, creativity and beauty. A nihilist, with regard 
to  such values,  finds  nothing  (or  little)  valuable  in  it,  where  (as  Nietzsche  sees  it)  there  is 
something valuable, and the nihilist’s aﬀective orientation and patterns of concern bear out this 
problematic stance. 
The account I propose is a simple one, so simple that it is surprising that it has not 
received greater attention.  One problem is that interpreters, perhaps out of fear of turning 5
Nietzsche into a remonstrating chastiser, have tried to characterize nihilism in a largely value-
neutral way, abstracting from Nietzsche’s own value commitments.  (God forbid that the great 6
fulminator Nietzsche should think other people are “wrong” or that his philosophical project 
should  fundamentally  depend  on  “value  judgments”!)  They  have  focused  instead  on  the 
descriptive psychology of nihilists (e.g, being in despair, lacking powerful aﬀects, turned against 
their drives, and so on) or on the formal job description of what nihilistic values are like (e.g., 
not realizable in this world) or some combination of these. Although this sheds some useful 
light on nihilism, it misses, I believe, a key dimension of the phenomenon Nietzsche is seeking 
to characterize, and also misses a main reason why he thinks of it as a problem. We can’t, as I 
see it, grasp what Nietzsche’s central complaint is, unless we bring key Nietzschean values to 
bear, and see nihilism as, at core, a condition of coming unmoored from these values. 
 The closest I’ve found is in Schacht (1973). Although our respective interpretations have various disagreements 5
about the content and nature of the Nietzschean values, and in the exact characterization of what nihilism 
amounts to, there is some considerable aﬃnity in our accounts, at least in the idea that nihilism involves failing to 
find value where there is value. 
 Schacht (1973) is in marked contrast to the recent trend. Danto (1964) maintains that Nietzsche does not attack 6
nihilism, but rather that he himself is a nihilist. This implausible view is thoroughly and eﬀectively dismantled in 
Schacht (1973). Some views that interpret nihilism meta-ethically (Langsam (1997); Hussain (2007)) also take it that 
Nietzsche is, in some sense, a nihilist. Although to my mind this it is mark against these readings that Nietzsche 
himself ends up as a nihilist, they correctly see that nihilism is something Nietzsche thinks we need some way of 
counteracting. 
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Nietzsche never produced a worked-out account of nihilism. Compare his treatment of 
other moral-psychological phenomena, such as ressentiment, guilt, bad conscience, the ascetic 
ideal,  and the will  to truth. On such matters,  much remains hazy to be sure,  but we have 
relatively more worked out ideas in the published text. With nihilism by contrast, much of the 
relevant material  is  found in Nietzsche’s notebooks. Given that this is  material  he did not 
publish, it is reasonable to wonder how much one can rely on it. These jottings are no doubt 
important  for  giving  a  preliminary  indication  of  Nietzsche’s  views  on  nihilism,  and  good 
arguments have been given for thus putting considerable weight on the notebooks.  But if we 7
take  on  board  everything  Nietzsche  says  in  the  notebooks,  it  is,  I  believe,  going  to  be 
impossible to weave it all together into a coherent philosophical position.  This should come as 8
no great surprise. These are notebooks, where Nietzsche is sketching and trying out ideas, and 
not all of those ideas represent what should be his final, considered position.
We need to think philosophically with Nietzsche, if we are to explore an issue where his 
final published remarks are so thin. That is what I intend to do here. I would like to propose 
the following methodology. It is, as I shall call it, phenomena-first. That is, we should identify the 
main phenomena that Nietzsche regards as nihilistic,  and then try to work out what, seen 
through  a  Nietzschean  lens,  might  be  nihilistic  about  them.  To  this  end,  we  look  to  the 
published texts and secondarily to the notebooks for some elucidation. But we should not 
begin  from  Nietzsche’s  sketchy  and  inconsistent  characterizations  of  nihilism  from  the 
notebooks. The six main manifestations we need to account for are as follows: 
Christianity (TI, 21; A, 20; A, 58; EH, “Why I Write Such Good Books,” 1; EH, “BT,” 2 )
Buddhism (A, 20; CW, “Postscript”)
 Reginster (2006). 7
 As a stark illustration of this: The notebooks from the 1887-8 period can make it seem as though nihilism is a 8
recent phenomenon. Nihilism is “at the door,” (WP, 1) or that what is coming is the “advent” [Heraufkunft] of 
nihilism (WP, “Preface,” 1). But at roughly the same time, Nietzsche is claiming, in ideas he actually chose to publish, 
that the two-millennia-old phenomenon of Christianity is itself nihilistic.
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Schopenhauer (A, 7; TI, 21; Cf., GM, “Preface,” 5)
Post-Christianity, as seen in the despair of the “madman” (GS, 125) 
The fanatical “will to truth” (BGE, 10; Cf, GM III: 24). 
The ‘Last Man’ (TSZ, “Prologue”)
In the sections to follow, I will  consider several  recent interpretations.  While these 
have, to varying degrees, gotten important aspects of nihilism, none, it seems to me, has really 
gotten into view a unifying thread connecting the main phenomena Nietzsche thinks of as 
nihilistic. That is not of course to say that the extant views should be rejected in toto. A unifying 
thread is  neither an exhaustive explanation of the phenomenon in question (the attendant 
psychologies are important too), nor even a suﬃcient condition of it. In this respect, this paper 
incorporates  (or  is  compatible  with)  a  good bit  of  the  existing  literature,  while  still  going 
beyond it to illuminate an interesting strand tying various nihilistic phenomena together. 
The unifying thread of Nietzschean nihilism, on my reading, turns out to be not some 
idiosyncratic and distinctive invention of Nietzsche’s. It is structurally similar to the familiar 
idea  of  nihilism we  get  in  a  number  of  other  19th  century  thinkers  (Jacobi)  and  authors 
(Dostoevsky,  Turgenev)—and  indeed  from those  moralists  who  brand  Nietzsche  himself  a 
dangerous  nihilist.  Where  he  diﬀers  from  them  is  not  in  his  account  of  what  nihilism 
fundamentally is (i.e.,  coming unmoored from values),  but in the values he sees nihilists as 
having come unmoored from. 
II. Nihilism as meta-ethics
Another,  very diﬀerent understanding of  nihilism is  of  course in wide philosophical 
circulation. In contemporary analytic meta-ethics, nihilism is the view that there are no facts 
about value. Because Nietzsche is often taken to subscribe to such a meta-ethical position, it is 
sometimes thought that he is  himself,  in this  sense,  a  nihilist.  Thus,  Nadeem Hussain,  for 
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example, characterizes the Nietzschean problem of nihilism as the issue of i) there being no 
facts about value, ii) one coming to believe this at the theoretical level, and iii) therefore at the 
practical level potentially becoming dispirited and subject to a certain paralysis of will.  On 
Hussain’s reading, Nietzsche sees the need for creating fictional simulacra of values, because a 
life without values would unbearable.  Reginster opts for a similar view, at least as one aspect of 9
his  reading.  He  suggests  that  the  nihilist  is  someone  who  is  “disoriented”  in  the  face  of 
realizing that there are not any objective values, and stands in need of some response to this 
problem.  10
There are two questions that need to be separated. First, does Nietzsche hold such a 
meta-ethical position, of anti-realist or error-theoretic skepticism? Second, even if he does, 
does this, in his eyes, amount to nihilism? The first issue, I believe, is less of a settled matter 
than it is sometimes taken to be.  But let’s put this aside. Suppose we agree for the sake of 11
argument  that  Nietzsche  is  himself  doubtful  that  there  are  objective  values  (i.e.,  mind-
independent evaluative facts).  Is  the meta-ethical  belief  that there are no such evaluative 12
facts, and the practical consequences of such a belief, tantamount to Nietzschean nihilism? 
This is implausible for two reasons. The first reason is that it makes Nietzsche seem a nihilist 
along with his targets.  This can be dealt with somewhat by saying that while Nietzsche may 13
be a “theoretical” nihilist, he is not a “practical” nihilist.  Still, it has the unhappy consequence 14
 Hussain (2007).  Cp., Langsam (1997); Reginster (2006), who propose a more subjectivist response. 9
 Reginster’s nihilism of disorientation (2006) at times seems meta-ethical, at times at the first-order level (an 10
absence of a certain kind of values). Hussain (2012) and Clark (2012) take Reginster to subscribe to the former 
meta-ethical twist on disorientation. Katsafanas (2015) and Gemes (forthcoming) take Reginster to mean 
something structural at the first-order level: the absence of certain kind of values (‘overarching,’ ‘final,’ etc).
 For doubts about whether there is a clear Nietzschean meta-ethical position, see Hussain (2013), retrenching 11
from his earlier view; Huddleston (2014). 
 Evaluative facts here need to be understood as “mind-independent evaluative facts,” since on Reginster’s 12
subjectivist reading (2006), there could be evaluative facts, albeit perspectival/ subjective ones. 
 Proponents of such readings do diﬀerentiate between “theoretical” and “practical” nihilism, and attribute only 13
the former to Nietzsche himself. There is a weak textual case that Nietzsche regards what is labelled “theoretical 
nihilism” as actually a form of nihilism. And there is also a weak textual case that the forms of psychological 
dismay labelled as “practical nihilism” in question get going as a result of a theoretical meta-ethical belief. 
 This terminology is due to Hussain (2007). 14
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of making Nietzsche out to be, by his lights, a nihilist even at the theoretical level. The textual 
evidence for this is,  to my mind, not strong, even taking the notebooks into account. The 
second reason is  that  several  forms of  nihilism that  Nietzsche criticizes  do not share this 
putative  value  skepticism,  and  none  clearly  shares  it.  Many  Nietzschean  nihilists  are  not 
doubtful about the existence of objective values. I will take these two points in turn. 
Does Nietzsche ascribe nihilism to himself, as his own current philosophical view?  So 15
far  as  I  know,  there  are  no  passages  where  he  does  so  in  the  published  work.  In  the 16
notebooks, he mentions that he was a “thoroughgoing nihilist” (WP, 25) and someone who has 
“lived through the whole of nihilism, to the end, leaving it behind, outside himself ” (WP, 3). 
But these are claims describing his past self.  The straightforward explanation for why he was a 17
nihilist is that he was, at one point anyway, a convinced Schopenhauerian, if not concerning the 
metaphysics, at least concerning Schopenhauer’s negative judgment on existence as a horrible 
cycle of endlessly unfulfilled striving and suﬀering. Nietzsche gets past this sort of life-denial 
that  is  an undercurrent in The  Birth  of  Tragedy.  If  Nietzsche indeed continued to think of 
himself as nihilistic in virtue of his meta-ethical views, he gives no indication of this. It is true 
that Nietzsche uses the term “nihilism” in various ways in the notebooks, but I can find no 
good evidence he uses it to refer to this meta-ethical thesis, or that he self-ascribes “nihilism” 
as his own present philosophical position.
The  closest  we  get  is  the  sometime-characterization  of  nihilism  as  the  belief  in 
“valuelessness”  (WP, 8).  But  there  is  a  crucial  ambiguity  here.  This  could,  at  a  stretch,  be 
construed meta-ethically, as a doubt about whether there are values. But it makes far better 
sense of the texts if this is construed as a negative first-order normative judgment rendered on 
the world, to the eﬀect that it is value-less because bad. The world is valueless, in the eyes of 
 Danto (1964) suggests that he does, as does Langsam (1997). For a contrary view, see Schacht (1973). 15
 He does call himself at times a “pessimist,” but pessimism and nihilism are not the same thing. 16
 Schacht (1973).17
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the Christian, Buddhist, and the Schopenhauerian, because it is the locus of suﬀering and evil. 
For this reason, they seek escape from this world. They are not in doubt about values tout 
court,  nor are they thinking that their  own values lack standing.  Quite the contrary.  They 
would  seem committed  to  the  objectivity  of  the  values  in  light  of  which  they  make  this 
thoroughly nihilistic judgment on the valuelessness of life and the world.  When Nietzsche, for 
example, writes, “one has deprived reality of its value, its meaning, its truthfulness, precisely to 
the extent to which one has mendaciously invented an ideal world.” (EH, “Preface,” 2),  his 
claim is meant at the first-order evaluative level. One deprives reality of its “value,” not because 
one  doubts  the  meta-ethics  of  value  (though  one  may  also  doubt  that  independently,  on 
abstract philosophical grounds), but because one judges reality unfavorably, in comparison to 
the ideal world of one’s invention, or to some counter-ideal. 
Of our core nihilistic phenomena, nihilism understood in a meta-ethical way is only 
potentially a feature of two of them, the post-Christian and the last-man, and even here, it is a 
questionable  interpretive  thesis.  Does  the  last-man  doubt  that  comfort  and  satiety  are 
objective values? There is not really any textual evidence one way or another on this.  One 
thinks, if anything, that he would be unperturbed, regardless of the outcome of this abstruse 
and  to  him  largely  irrelevant  meta-ethical  dispute,  and  likely  unwilling  to  take  such 
philosophical matters as of any importance. So we are left with the post-Christian in the wake 
of the death of God. Does he doubt the existence of evaluative facts? Maybe. The language of 
Gay Science §125 certainly suggests an air of what Reginster rightly calls “disorientation”: “What 
were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither 
are we moving? Away from all  suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, 
forward, in all directions? Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying as through an 
infinite  nothing?”  (GS,  125).  But  is  this  indicative  of  meta-ethical  doubts,  or  is  it  a 
manifestation of doubt about whether there is cosmic or existential meaning? One might after 
all  take it to be objectively valuable that the world have such meaning and find it wanting 
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because it doesn’t seem to (anymore).  Or might this be giving voice to epistemic-evaluative 
doubts about what the values are, in a world from which God has been evacuated? What, in 
other  words,  do  we  throw  our  weight  behind,  when  we’ve  lost  our  previous  point  of 
orientation? We’re not really given enough detail from Nietzsche in order to settle this. And 
perhaps there is not a unitary answer, with some in post-Christian modernity despondent that 
there are no value facts, others thinking it is a fact that the world is bad, because there is no 
God to guide us, recompense us for suﬀering, grant us meaning, and so on, others thinking that 
there could in principle be values, but epistemically uncertain about what such values would 
be. And the question would still remain: Is it in virtue of their skeptical meta-ethical conviction 
that these people are nihilistic, by Nietzsche’s lights? That, to me, is questionable. They more 
clearly are nihilistic insofar as they are failing to respond favorably to this life and world, and 
the sort of good things it contains. Their energy instead remains invested in the collapsing 
Christian worldview. It’s a matter of their not being able to find this life and world valuable. It is 
this valuation, rather than their beliefs about the meta-ethics or metaphysics of such value and 
the attendant consequences, that is Nietzsche’s foremost concern when it comes to nihilism.
The  meta-ethical  characterization  of  nihilism  really  does  not  do  justice  to  the 
phenomenon that Nietzsche is seeking to bring into view. Yet Nietzsche, for all I’ve said, may 
be a nihilist in the sense of that term given in contemporary meta-ethics. But there are not 
good grounds for thinking that this is what Nietzsche takes nihilism to be. Nor are there good 
grounds for thinking that this is a helpful characterization of the phenomena of nihilism that 
Nietzsche sets out to characterize. Nietzsche, after all, thinks that we are always in a process of 
valuing. It would virtually be unrecognizable as a human form of life for us to live completely 
without valuing and the attendant sort of values in this sense.  Nietzsche’s central concern, vis 18
à  vis  nihilism,  is  arguably  much  more  with  what  people  take  to  be  valuable,  than  with  a 
theoretical belief about meta-ethics likely to be had by very few people indeed. But we must be 
 Katsafanas (2015).18
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careful  here:  While  Nietzsche  thinks  valuing  something—anything—is  better  than  valuing 
nothing, it  is  not suﬃcient to escape nihilism that one undertakes such a form of valuing, 
however fervent and committed that valuing may be. It also matters what one values, because 
nihilism is a matter of coming unmoored from the valuable. Or so I shall argue. This all, it 
bears pointing out again, rests on first-order normative claims of Nietzsche’s about what the 
values are. These are compatible with the full gamut of potential meta-ethical positions. The 
account I propose does not rely on Nietzsche being a realist, nor is it threatened if he is an 
anti-realist or expressivist.
III. Nihilism as Despair
I  would now like  to  turn to  discussing  the other  dimension of  Bernard Reginster’s 
account, the aspect on which he rightly rests more weight. As outlined in the previous section, 
the first aspect he identifies in nihilism is the “disorientation” related to the realization that 
there are no objective values. The other, and arguably more distinctive aspect that Reginster 
highlights is the nihilism of despair. The issue for this brand of nihilist is more about the world 
than about the status of values.  He is nihilistic in his belief that the world is inhospitable for 19
the realization of his most important values. 
One of the great merits of this account is  that it  oﬀers to make excellent sense of 
something  that  might  otherwise  be  very  puzzling:  namely,  why  the  Schopenhauerian  is  a 
paradigmatic kind of nihilist. The Schopenhauerian, on Reginster’s reading, maintains strong 
value  commmitments,  which  say  that  suﬀering  is  extremely  bad.  The  Schopenhauerian 20
further thinks that the world contains a great predominance of suﬀering over pleasure. This is 
not just an incidental feature of the world, but it is a product of the very nature of willing. As 
 Reginster (2006). 19
 There are some important interpretive complexities here. Schopenhauer’s condemnation of suﬀering can be  20
misleading. His highest good is not hedonistic happiness, of the sort foiled through desires being perpetually 
thwarted, but rather it is negation of the will. This negation, on his view, is realizable in this world, albeit not 
through conscious individual eﬀort, but rather through something akin to grace, in which one becomes detached 
from willing. For further discussion of these issues, see Janaway (2016) and Janaway (Forthcoming).
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Schopenhauer’s famous argument goes, we are perpetually buﬀeted between the unpleasant 
states of pain and boredom. The little respite we receive is fleeting. Existence is bad, and it 
would be better  for  us  never  to have come into being.  A similar  point  perhaps applies  to 
Buddhism, as Nietzsche understands it.  It too condemns existence, and seeks to detach us 
from it, though Nietzsche is far less explicit on this front. Reginster’s account also potentially 
explains the reaction on the part of the disappointed Christian, in the wake of the death of 
God. Such a person, Nietzsche holds, was very invested in a worldview in which life in this 
world was recompensed by God and a better life in a beyond. It is this beyond that secures 
what  is  of  value  for  him.  But  with  the  ‘Death  of  God,’  belief  in  this  metaphysical  realm 
becomes untenable, and he thus falls into a kind of despair, when he sees that these values can’t 
be secured in the world as it is. 
But such a conception of nihilism has more trouble when it comes to accounting for 
three other main forms of nihilism: that which we see in the Christian, in the fanatical devotee 
of truth-seeking, and in the last man.  (Moreover, none of these is very well accounted for with 21
Reginster’s category of “disorientation” either). I will take these characters in turn. 
The Christian is not despairing.  Even though he believes that various features of the 22
world are bad, he is reassured by the possibility of a heavenly redemption. Upon his death, he 
will be brought to heaven, where he will be in the company of God, the saints, and the angels. 
This is thus a cause of hope and not of despair. Still, it might be thought that the Christian 
would or should be despairing, at least about his values being realized in this life and world. That 
may be true, but “despair” does not seem to characterize well his reigning psychology, precisely 
because of the hopeful otherworldly theological beliefs that give him comfort, in the face of 
these negative beliefs about life. Indeed, the Christian who is in the throes of despair would be 
 See Gemes (2008; Forthcoming). 21
 Perhaps there could be a state of unconscious or proto-conscious despair in half-hearted Christians, in the vein 22
of Sickness Unto Death. (This idea of despair seems to me to court paradox, if not outright unintelligibility, since 
arguably a key part of despair is the reflexive awareness of being in that state.) But in any event, the key thing is 
that the Christian with full-blooded faith doesn’t escape the charge of nihilism. He is a nihilist in virtue of his 
fervent Christianity. 
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the Christian with doubts, not the ardently-believing Christian. The trouble, however, is that 
Nietzsche clearly thinks of Christianity as nihilistic (TI, 21; A, 20; A, 58; EH, “Why I Write 
Such Good Books,” 1; EH, “BT,” 2). Reginster’s application of “despair” must then either be 
construed as a conditional claim or as a historical-predictive claim. Conditionally construed, it 
would be: If the Christian saw the true character of the world, freed from her illusions, then 
she  would  be  despairing.  That  seems  right.  Yet  what  is  the  key  explanation  for  why  this 
conditional holds? It is that the Christian is basically opposed to this life and world, as they 
actually are,  and lauds various counter-values.  Her nihilism, I would suggest,  fundamentally 
consists in coming unmoored from the value of these things, not in the ancillary, conditional 
psychological fact that she would be subject to despair, if stripped of her illusions. In historical-
predictive  terms,  the  idea  would  be:  Christianity  is  nihilistic,  because  as  its  will  to  truth 
unfolds,  it  will  eventually unmask its  own illusions,  and leave one with despair  once these 
illusions are unmasked. This trajectory is  right,  but it  is  a strain to say that the individual 
believing Christian is nihilistic, in virtue of some despairing attitudes later post-Christians will 
have,  as  history  unfolds.  Although  Reginster  would  no  doubt  agree  that  the  Christian  is 
nihilistically oriented against life and the world, my preferred account helps to explain this 
failing better than an emphasis on the psychological state of despair can. 
Let us now consider the fanatical truth-seeker. The first thing to bear in mind that 
Nietzsche is not hostile to truth-seeking tout court.There are healthy, admirable forms of it. 
What he finds perverse is a condition, under the influence of the ascetic ideal, where truth has 
been  raised  to  a  the  status  of  a  supreme,  unconditional  value,  to  which  all  else  must  be 
sacrificed.  Sometimes, Nietzsche speaks of such truth fanatics as “despairing” souls (BGE, 10). 23
But other times, such people see a kind of immense meaning in their scholarly enterprise, even 
if  this  is  thanks,  perversely,  to  the  meaning  provided  courtesy  of  the  ascetic  ideal.  Being 
wedded to the ascetic ideal saves them, as it does the Christian, from what Nietzsche calls 
 Gemes (1992). 23
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“suicidal nihilism” (GM, III:28). But it does so at the cost of ensnaring them in the clutches of 
another  form of nihilism, whereby they deny this  life  and world (GS, 344;  GM, III:24).  In 
discussing why this fanatical ascetic truth-seeking is a nihilistic problem, despair, it seems to 
me, is the wrong category to use. The whole point of the ascetic ideal is that it staves oﬀ despair 
through providing a meaning. Though this truth-seeker values one valuable thing (truth), she is 
so monomaniacally attached to this value that it squeezes out the others, and she, in most 
other respects, becomes unmoored from all other worldly values. She knows, and loves, what 
she can find out through the end of the microscope, or what she can read in dusty tomes in the 
library, but the rest of life and the world exerts no real appeal. She has a nihilistic problem, but 
that problem is not best described as one of despair. 
Turning now to the “last man”: No one could be further from despair. Such a person 
seems very satisfied with his pleasant creature comforts: 
Alas, the time is coming when man will no longer give birth to a star. Alas, the time of 
the most despicable man is coming, he that is no longer able to despise himself. Behold, 
I show you the last man. 
“What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?” thus asks the last 
man, and he blinks. 
The earth has become small, and on it hops the last man, who makes everything small. 
His race is as ineradicable as the flea-beetle; the last man lives longest. 
“We have invented happiness,” say the last men, and they blink. They have left the 
regions where it was hard to live, for one needs warmth. One still loves one’s neighbor 
and rubs against him, for one needs warmth. One still works, for work is a form of 
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entertainment. But one is careful lest the entertainment be too harrowing. One no 
longer becomes poor or rich: both require too much exertion. Who still wants to rule? 
Who obey? Both require too much exertion. 
“We have invented happiness,” say the last men, and they blink (TSZ, “Preface”)
The  characteristic  problem  with  the  nihilism  of  despair  centers  on  the  psychologically-
troubling realization that one’s values are not realizable in this world. Yet because the last-man 
has adjusted his standards so far downward, they are able to be met (relatively) easily in this 
world. He’s under a wooly blanket, snuggled by the burbling radiator, drinking his instant cocoa 
with miniature marshmallows, from his ‘Life is Good’ ™ mug, thinking this is as good as life 
can get.  Does this warm satisfaction mean that he is not nihilistic? By Nietzsche’s lights, 24
absolutely  not.  This,  too,  is  a  form  of  Nietzschean  nihilism.  Granted,  Nietzsche  never 
explicitly  uses  the  terminology  of  nihilism in  describing  the  ‘last  man.’  The  language  of 
Zarathustra is too highly poeticized and non-technical for that. Still, it would seem pretty clear 
that  Nietzsche wants  us  to  think of  such a  person as  the  very  nadir  of  the  condition he 
elsewhere describes as nihilism.  Yet what is nihilistic about the last man is neither despair or 25
disorientation. It is rather, as I will suggest in the positive part of the paper, his failure to 
appreciate important sorts of value where there is value—to blink in the face of the star, to 
find nothing worthwhile where there is something worthwhile. 
I have so far tried to suggest that an account of nihilism as despair is not going to be 
able  to  make  sense  of  some  of  its  most  important  forms,  especially  the  sort  we  see  in 
Christianity and in the last man. None of this is to deny, however, that despair is indeed one 
key psychological characteristic of certain forms of nihilism, and is highly illuminating for that 
 http://www.lifeisgood.com/home-pet/drinkware/24
 A number of scholars are agreed on this point: See Pippin (2010); Katsafanas (2015); Gemes (Forthcoming). Even 25
if one is somewhat skeptical about the inclusion of the last man under the rubric of nihilism on textual grounds, 
my case could be read here as a way of seeing why it would make sense to include him, along with the Christian, 
under this heading. 
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reason. But it has not gotten to the core of what unites various forms of nihilism, and it seems 
to me to leave out an important dimension of Nietzsche’s critique. Nihilists are not just people 
who find themselves in a sorry psychological spot on account of feeling despair. They are, by 
Nietzsche’s lights, people who have come unmoored from values, and are apt targets of ethical 
scrutiny as a result. 
V.  Aﬀective Nihilism
As we just saw, one challenge with construing nihilism as a form of despair (or indeed a 
form of meta-ethical disorientation), is that it leaves no explanation for the nihilism of the 
fervently-devout Christian. I would now like to turn to an account that is better positioned 
when it comes to making sense of this. In a response to Reginster’s account, Ken Gemes seeks 
to take a more drive-psychological approach, which he labels “aﬀective nihilism.” He proposes 
that in addition to the nihilism of disorientation and despair, there is a more “fundamental” 
kind of nihilism, consisting in the drives being turned against each other.  Gemes’s counter-26
proposal  grew out  of  two  objections  he  posed  for  Reginster.  His  first  objection  is  that 27
disorientation and despair  seem too purely cognitive,  being philosophical  theses about the 
existence of values or their realizability in the world. For Gemes, we need to look beyond just 
this surface (maybe epiphenomenal) cognitive level to the underlying structure of the agent’s 
drives. The second objection, already canvassed above, is that Reginster is unable to account 
for the nihilism of the Christian. 
One of the merits of the aﬀective nihilism approach is that it is able to tie together the 
nihilism of the Schopenhauerian and Buddhist with that of the Christian (and possibly the 
despairing post-Christian, and the fanatical truth-seeker, insofar as they remain in thrall  to 
Christian values, even once they give up on the metaphysics). All these forms of nihilist see 
 Gemes (Forthcoming).26
 Gemes (2008). 27
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their drives (particularly their aggressive and sexual drives) as things that are fundamentally 
suspicious and worthy of mortification or elimination. It is in this regard that they all subscribe 
to the ascetic ideal. Moreover, Nietzsche seems to think that much that is important with us 
happens at the unconscious level. On Gemes’s view, this underlying psychological condition 
(the drives being turned against each other) explains the presence of their more articulated 
theoretical beliefs and commitments about the world being valueless and the like. 
While Gemes oﬀers persuasive criticisms, and a promising alternative account to those 
we  have  explored,  it  seems  to  me  that  there  are  also  some  significant  limitations.  The 
overarching problem is that it strays too far from the idea of nihilism as a condition of our 
values and valuing, and tries instead to give a psycho-biological naturalistic explanation of what 
might underlie or cause this condition. There is certainly the danger of over-intellectualizing 
the phenomenon of nihilism. But there is also the danger of being too reductive about it. 
This becomes a problem when we try to account for what is nihilistic about worldviews, 
in addition to the individuals that subscribe to those worldviews. In The Antichrist, Nietzsche’s 
view  is  that  both  Buddhism  and  Christianity  are  nihilistic  religions  (A,  2o).  We  could 
understand this as simply a roundabout claim to the eﬀect that their adherents are possessed 
of nihilistic psychologies. But it would be nice if we could find an explanation in virtue of 
which  both  the  worldview  and  its  adherents  are  nihilistic.  Because  of  its  reductive 
psychological  focus,  instead  of  focus  on  the  content  of  the  relevant  evaluative  attitudes 
themselves, the aﬀective nihilism account is not well-positioned to do this. Yet my account can 
make sense of this easily: People are nihilistic insofar as they have come unmoored from the 
most important values. And worldviews are nihilistic on similar grounds in their commitments 
and orientation.
In addition, the aﬀective nihilism account has diﬃculty accounting for the “last man.” 
He does not seem rife with this sort of internal conflict, of drive turned against drive. To be 
fair, the last man is a poetic creation, and is quite under-described in Nietzsche’s work. But, to 
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the extent that we do have a grip on this character, there is no evidence for thinking that the 
drives being turned against themselves is his underlying problem. Of course, the last man is not 
a person in whom active drives associated with the will to power predominate; in him, their 
force is certainly lessened, to the point of being nil. But this does not mean that they are being 
repressed or suppressed; that would suggest an ongoing eﬀort or struggle (e.g., on the part of 
other drives) to keep them at bay, with the agent being riven by an attendant psychological 
conflict (as in the Christian who loathes his sex drive and fiercely represses it). Is this really 
how Nietzsche wants us to think of the last man? If so, we get no indication of that in his 
characterization of him as pleasantly unperturbed. Perhaps a certain proto-Freudian hydraulic 
assumption  is  operative  in  the  background:   Drives  (such  as  those  toward  power)  are 
ineliminable and retain their fundamental force, regardless of how they are channeled. They 
are either expressed outwardly, or sublimated, or suppressed/repressed; elimination or dynamic 
weakening (through oneself or external influences and forces) is not possible. This would then 
allow for the idea that however things look on the surface, there must  still  be suppression/
repression going on in the last man; his ‘active’ drives can’t just disappear. Some text can point 
in this direction (GM, III: 7), but it is a controversial interpretive matter whether Nietzsche 
endorses this model.  The last man would indeed seem to be the best evidence against the idea 28
that Nietzsche subscribes to this hydraulic view, since he is such a good illustration of what 
happens when certain drives are (putatively) weakened in force or eliminated. 
Indeed, it is not clear why it is always bad, from a Nietzschean perspective, that the 
drives are turned against themselves. This an assumption of Gemes’s account, and it is not 
clear why we should accept it. There are certainly instances where it is bad. But I think we 
should also leave space for the possibility that the drives might be turned against themselves in 
 In this passage (GM III:7), Nietzsche says that striving for “an optimum of favorable conditions under which it 28
can vent its power completely and attain its maximal feeling of power” is something “every animal” “instinctively” 
does. But as Nietzsche makes clear in GM II and III, instincts can be etiolated and twisted in various ways, 
thanks to various psychological and social influences. From the fact that this is what animals instinctively do, it 
does not follow that this is what human animals all now do. (For a corrective against reading the will to power as 
an ambitious, generalized thesis about all human motivation, see Clark (2017)). 
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ways that are not problematic and do not amount to nihilism. Consider the artist pulled in one 
way by his voracious sex drive, and another way by his drive for artistic creativity, where these 
struggle for mastery, and each tries to suppress the other.  Perhaps it would be optimal, from 29
the perspective of psychological health, if he integrated these drives, so that, for example, his 
sublimated  sex  drive  achieved  expression  in  his  art.  But  the  fact  that  these  drives  try  to 
suppress each other does not seem at all indicative of nihilism, particularly as both are drives 
directed toward satisfaction in this life and world, not in a beyond. Or consider the person 
with some (even by her lights) problematic vestige of the ascetic ideal in her, in the form of a 
drive to nothingness, but who makes ongoing and partly successful eﬀorts to combat this drive 
to the ascetic ideal through her other drives. The fact that she seeks to suppress a drive is not, 
in this case, indicative of nihilism, but of a healthy countermovement to it. The presence of the 
drive to nothingness is indicative of nihilism, to be sure, but not the mere fact of turning 
against a drive and wanting to deprive it of its power. 
Like several current interpretations of nihilism, the aﬀective nihilism account, to its 
detriment, tries to be formal, and refrain from substantive normative characterizations of the 
appropriateness of particular drives or the goals of such drives. But it is diﬃcult to see what the 
textual or philosophical motivation for this is supposed to be. On the contrary, it would seem: 
Suppressing, weakening, or eliminating some drives is bad, and a sign of nihilism. Suppressing, 
weakening, or eliminating other drives is good, and is not a sign of nihilism. In working out 
whether someone is nihilistic, we can’t just look to the fact that a drive is being suppressed, 
weakened, or eliminated, but we have to look to what the drive in question is, and whether it 
should be suppressed, weakened, or eliminated.30
 What exactly these images amount to, and whether it would require a form of homuncular personification, is 29
another matter. This is a general challenge for drive-based psychologies.
 It may well be an ideal, for those few fortunately constituted, to express all of one’s drives and not to suppress, 30
weaken, or eliminate any drives. But it does not follow from this ideal that any instance of drive suppression, 
weakening, or elimination is thereby bad or nihilistic. Cp., Huddleston (2017). 
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This brings us to the fourth and final point: even if one can establish that there is some 
sense in which the drives are turned against one another in cases of nihilism, one also needs to 
establish that this is what the phenomenon of nihilism consists in. This seems to me to be a 
harder claim to make, because the goal-neutral explanation oﬀered (drives turned against each 
other,  with  no  mention  of  their  specific  goals)  doesn’t  seem to  pinpoint  what  actually  is 
nihilistic even in the cases (e.g., the Christian) where this happens. The issue, in the Christian 
and similar cases, is more about the substantive value commitments (and blindnesses) inherent 
in the drive-extinguishing goals  of certain regnant drives. It is the fact that these drives are 
turned against this life and world, and turned against the drives that are directed toward this 
life and world,  not the mere fact that they are turned against some other drives.  My own 
account provides the explanation of what has gone wrong here. Many of our basic drives are, 
according to Nietzsche, valuable aspects of life, and yet the Christian not only fails to value 
them; he downright demonizes them. Likewise, in the case of the last man, the issue is not that 
drives tout court are reduced to nothingness or to a low level of expression. Many drives toward 
shallow and petty goals will be expressed, perhaps energetically so, by the last man. It is instead 
that certain worthwhile drives (by Nietzsche’s lights) are not, for what whatever reason, being 
expressed.  This  lack  of  expression  of  certain  drives  is  perhaps  connected  to  a  valuational 
disorder in the agent, whether as cause or eﬀect. In any event, just talking about the dynamics 
of various drives is going to be insuﬃcient for characterizing the phenomenon of nihilism. 
VI. Nihilism and ‘Higher’ Values
A major challenge for the aﬀective nihilism reading and the despair reading is that they 
are unable to cope well with the “last man.” I would now like to turn to two approaches that do 
a better job on this front. Robert Pippin has oﬀered an account of such nihilism organized 
around  the  idea  of  eros,  and,  in  particular,  the  “flickering  out”  of  this  erotic  flame.  31
 Pippin (2010). 31
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Importantly, he does not mean by the erotic the reductive Freudian idea of a sex drive. He 
instead has in mind, in a more Platonic register, a condition of soul, where it can be drawn 
upward  to  higher  things.  On  the  Platonic  picture,  elaborated  in  the  Symposium  and  the 
Phaedrus,  love begins  with the earthly  and ephemeral,  the beauty of  bodies.  From here,  it 
moves  upward  to  a  love  of  spiritual  qualities  of  character,  and  eventually  onward  to 
contemplation of the forms, at the pinnacle, the form of the good itself.  Nietzsche will  of 
course not want such a metaphysics, ethics, or epistemology. But the basic idea of the soul 
drawn (or not) toward higher things is an apt way of explaining what has gone wrong with the 
last man. To use one of Nietzsche’s own images from the Preface to Beyond Good and Evil, and 
earlier in Zarathustra (“Prologue”), the bow is losing its tension, and we will not be able to shoot 
for distant goals.  Pippin’s account focuses on a certain motivational-psychological condition, 32
an inability to be inspired and committed in a certain deep and lasting way. 
In a similar vein, Paul Katsafanas has proposed a helpful account focusing on what these 
higher values would need to be like. As Katsafanas rightly notes, the problem with the last man 
is not a lack of values. It is not even a lack of hierarchical structure to his values—a lack, that is 
to say, of things he values for their own sake. For the last man elevates certain things highly, 
and does others for the sake of them. Katsafanas writes: “they have no shortage of values, 
including final values. They value comfort, satiety, warmth, happiness, mild and diverting work, 
lack of quarrel, and so on. Indeed, their values seem strikingly similar to the ones championed 
in our culture.”  Katsafanas goes on to analyze the problem with such values, by contrasting 33
them with other “higher” sorts of values “distinguished by their demandingness, susceptibility 
toward  creating  tragic  conflicts,  recruitment  of  a  characteristic  set  of  powerful  emotions, 
 Cp. Clark and Dudrick (2012) on this rich image. 32
 Katsafanas (2015). 33
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perceived import, exclusionary nature, and their tendency to instantiate a community. These 
features are most familiar in religiously-sanctioned values, but arise elsewhere as well.”34
This, I believe, does pinpoint something nice about the kind of values that the last man 
subscribes to.  As a general  account of nihilism, however,  these sorts of approaches cannot 
work, since devoted Christians, Buddhists, and Schopenhauerians have “eros” in Pippin’s sense, 
and they have “higher values” in Katsafanas’s sense (heavenly redemption, nirvana, negation of 
the will, and so on). Katsafanas acknowledges as much.  Pippin should presumably do so as 35
well. For the image of the bow he draws on is one Nietzsche uses precisely to remind us that in 
Christian-Platonic  Europe  the  bow  remained  taught  (BGE,  “Preface”).  Nonetheless,  this 
psychology, and the lack of higher values would seem, so far as it goes, to characterize aptly the 
sort of nihilism that can aﬄict the last man, and also Nietzsche’s sometime association of 
nihilism with a certain form of goallessness (WP, 2). 
In the face of this, we could opt for a disjunctive way of thinking about nihilism, and 
hold that there are diﬀerent types of it  in diﬀerent cases.  This might further be part of a 
historicized narrative, whereby nihilism takes diﬀerent shapes at diﬀerent periods. While it is 
helpful to have this additional degree of detail in the story told about nihilism by seeing its 
distinctive form with the last man, it would also be helpful to see what, if anything, unites 
these disparate characters. I claim that while there are many diﬀerences, there is an underlying 
unity here. 
As with the other nihilists we have seen, the problem with the last man is not so much 
one  of  diminished  drive,  motivation,  and  aﬀect,  though  such  a  psychology  is  indeed 
characteristic of him too. For matters wouldn’t be improved, if he remained devoted to the 
same shallow things, but in a more fervent way instead.  The problem with the last man, I 36
 Katsafanas (2015). 34
 Katsafanas (2015). As he acknowledges in a footnote, he seeks to describe one salient form of nihilism, rather 35
than trying to capture, e.g., the Christian too. 
 Anderson (2013) notes that even strong desires on the part of the last man do not allow him to escape nihilism. 36
Fervent devotion, if it is to petty things, may be even worse than modest devotion to them. 
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would suggest, is instead a lack of receptivity to value, more extreme than the kind we’ve seen 
in any of the nihilists thus far. He, like them, can’t attach himself to the right values. More than 
that, he can’t even see their allure. This is poetically rendered by Nietzsche in the repeated 
mention of his blinking (TSZ, “Prologue”). He doesn’t see the great star—the sun, the Platonic 
symbol  of  ultimate  goodness  and  value.  He  can’t  appreciate  creation,  longing,  love.  He  is 
content with the meager “happiness” he has “invented.” He is goalless, not in the sense of 
lacking goals entirely (he wants happiness, lack of quarrel, and comfort, after all), but lacking 
worthy higher goals. In the last man, we thus see the withering of the ability to love much of 
the loveable, to value much of the valuable, particularly when the going starts to get tough. No 
one is denying that chocolate cake and glasses of cool water are valuable too. But those are the 
easy things to value. It is another class of valuable things that Nietzsche is concerned with, 
those capable of conferring meaning on existence. Both the Pippin and Katsafanas accounts, it 
seems to me, are headed in the right direction: nihilism, they think, is a failing in our valuing, 
specifically a failure to sustain a certain kind of “higher” values. But we need, I believe, to take 
this approach further, into more richly substantive normative territory. That is what I shall do 
in the section that follows. 
VII. The Value-based approach
We  cannot  characterize  this  problem  of  nihilism  by  stopping  with  psychological-
motivational states (eros or its absence),  or with a formal job description of what “higher” 
values would need to be. What unites nihilists, I submit, is not their descriptive psychology of 
valuing, but instead what they are failing to value. They have come unmoored from the valuable. 
Their valuational commitments are directed away from many of the right sort of things, or 
connecting to them in only a weak fashion.
My emphasis on valuations being “right” and “wrong” (or in line with the valuable) can 
give a doubly misleading impression, however. First, it can seem like nihilism is just a kind of 
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factual  mistake,  of  simply believing  the wrong things are valuable.  But though this  may be 
involved,  this  is  not  the  core  failing.  There  is,  from  Nietzsche’s  perspective,  an  ethical 
misalignment consisting in a failure of responsiveness and commitment to values, where this is 
as aﬀective as it is cognitive, as much ethical as epistemic. Life and the world are to be loved, 
and yet, by many, they are despised (in large part, if not entirely). Excellence is to be celebrated, 
and yet it is held in complete indiﬀerence by the last man. Second, the talk of “right” and 
“wrong” can make it seem as if the view in question presupposes a kind of realism. My view fits 
nicely with a kind of realism of course, but it is important to notice that it is compatible with 
the full  gamut of meta-ethical positions, including strongly anti-realist or expressivist ones. 
These are claims about the metaphysical status of value as a property, or claims about what 
value  discourse  is  doing.  The  view  I  am proposing  does  not  wade  into  this  contentious 
territory; it requires only that Nietzsche have first-order evaluative commitments (in favor of 
this life and world, excellence, and so on). It is indisputable that he has these commitments. 
Whether these have real normative authority over other people, and whether he thinks these 
have real normative authority over other people, is another matter. For all I’ve said, Nietzsche 
might just be giving voice to his disapproval of certain values he does not share and the sorts of 
people attracted to such values. Being “in error” when it comes to values might amount to 
nothing more than being misaligned, by Nietzsche’s idiosyncratic lights. I will remain neutral on 
these issues. Yet whatever we think about Nietzsche’s meta-ethics, we should be cautious about 
a tacit inference that is endemic in this literature, and that would be seeming to underwrite the 
marked (and to my mind rather puzzling) move from the richly substantive to the thinly formal 
interpretations  of  Nietzsche.  It  would  seem  to  go  like  this:  “Nietzsche  is  not  a  realist. 
Therefore,  we  shouldn’t  attribute  to  him  views  that  presuppose  substantive  value 
commitments.” Even granting the premise—for which there is some textual evidence, albeit 
indecisive—this  inference confuses the meta-ethical  and first-order levels,  and threatens to 
turn Nietzsche from the highly judgmental fulminator he was, into a virtually unrecognizable 
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figure: a soft-minded, pussyfooting, content-neutral liberal who refrains from criticizing other 
people’s values.
I  have  identified something  that,  I  believe,  all  the  main  forms  of  nihilism have  in 
common. It is not for the sake of neat philosophical categorization that I do so. I think we 
bring out something crucially important about nihilism if we see what all the nihilists on the 
spectrum from the Christian to the last man share. They are people who have come unmoored 
from what is most valuable. This life and world, by Nietzsche’s lights, occupy that status. (This 
is  so,  it  is  key  to  reiterate,  independently  of  the  philosophers’  metaphysical  question  of 
whether  value  is  there  independently  of  us,  or  we,  in  some  sense  to  be  specified,  are  a 
subjective  condition  of  that  value,  or  are  simply  projecting  it  there  falsely,  and  so  on.) 
According to Nietzsche, this world surrounding us matters, matters more than any beyond, and 
yet for most of the past two thousand years of human history, we haven’t been able appreciate 
this. 
The Christian, Schopenhauerian, and Buddhist are committed to values that denigrate 
this life and world. They say that life is something from which we must escape, in order to 
repair to a better life. The things of this life they treat with suspicion and scorn. The post-
Christian remains committed to the basic values of Christianity, but is in a particularly bad 
position, because he is also painfully aware of the unrealizability of the most important of 
these values, and like the Christian, is insensitive to the meaning-conferring potential of some 
of the ‘this-wordly’ values that surround him. The fanatical truth-seeker adopts a worldview 
whereby one value crowds out the others. By the time of the last-man, we get to a point where 
just  everything Nietzsche cares  most  about has  ceased to matter.  They do  care  about this 
world, to be sure, but they care about what, by Nietzsche’s lights, are shallow, bovine things 
only. 
My account oﬀers an nice explanation of the historical trajectory of nihilism, and why 
things are getting worse in the descent toward the last man. Christian culture, for all its life-
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negation, is also the time of Brunelleschi, Michelangelo, and Raphael. Even as a beyond was 
lauded, this-worldly excellence and beauty thrived and were respected. Even as the body was 
denigrated as something lower and evil,  it was idealized and celebrated. The bow string, in 
Nietzsche’s multifarious image, was drawn taut, and the arrows of our longing could shoot for 
distant goals.  Christianity valued lives in which one was devoted to more than just animal 
satisfaction,  lives  in  which something that  could give  meaning to existence was  sought.  It 
played this role, as did Schopenhauerianism and Buddhism, in valorizing (however perversely) a 
saintly form of life-negation or Entselbstung. Of course, none of these three views make sense 
without a heavy-duty metaphysics,  if  not of God, then of the self and world. Once such a 
metaphysics (particularly of its Christian kind) no longer becomes sustainable, nihilism takes a 
somewhat  diﬀerent  and,  as  Reginster  rightly  identifies,  more  despairing  shape.  But  the 
common thread, I suggest, remains: having come unmoored from the highest values. Despair is 
to  some  small  degree  admirable,  because  it  bears  witness  to  a  fundamentally  religious 
sensibility—thwarted,  but  a  religious  sensibility  even  still.  With  the  last  man,  this  (very 37
broadly speaking)  religious sensibility evaporates.  The last  man does focus on this  life  and 
world,  but  on  its  most  sublunary  aspects  only,  not  on  any  of  its  most  important  higher, 
meaning-conferring aspects. The culture of the last man is the culture of entertainment, the 
culture of the shopping mall, the culture of people blinking in the face of majesty and grandeur, 
not awed, but eager to return to whatever trifling thing will occupy them next. In all of these 
stages of nihilism, the highest values, by Nietzsche’s lights, have been under-appreciated, or 
not appreciated at all. People are blind to such values, or can’t commit themselves to them. 
But is this Nietzsche’s own account of nihilism, or simply a reconstruction? As I said at 
the  outset,  my  methodological  approach  is  one  of  trying  to  work  out,  on  philosophical 
grounds,  what the best  Nietzschean story is  about what unites  the various phenomena he 
thinks of as nihilistic, rather than basing my account on reconstructing his remarks from the 
 I agree with Simon May (2011) that there is a lingering religious streak in Nietzsche.37
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notebooks. He sketched some ideas about nihilism, but never arrived at an adequate theory of 
the phenomena he sought to characterize.  Precisely because these were sketches, these ideas 
often  pull  in  diﬀerent  directions.  But  we  do  find indications  that  Nietzsche  was  grasping 
toward the sort of account I set out here. Nihilism, he tells us, is “the radical repudiation of 
value, meaning, and desirability” (WP, 1). This, as I have argued, should not be understood in 
meta-ethical terms, to the eﬀect that value, meaning, and desirability are bankrupt categories. 
Nietzsche is a diagnostician not of disaﬀected angst, or of the philosopher’s rarified skepticism 
about  normative  properties.  He  is  a  diagnostician  of  people  who,  in  large  part  remain 
committed  to  these  categories  of  value,  meaning,  and  desirability.  Nihilism consists  in  an 
inability  to  find  valuable  what  is  valuable,  to  find  meaningful  what  is  meaningful,  to  find 
desirable what is desirable. That is the radical repudiation in question, the repudiation of this 
life and world. “The world does not have the value we thought it had.... [But] the world might 
be far more valuable than we used to believe; . . . and while we thought that we accorded it the 
highest interpretation, we may not even have given our human existence a moderately fair 
value” (WP, 32).
As I have indicated, the key idea of Nietzschean nihilism, on my reading, turns out to 
be structurally similar to a familiar idea we already have in circulation. In figures such as Jacobi 
or  Dostoevsky,  nihilism is  not,  from the  standpoint  of  the  one  leveling  the  charge,  the 
conviction that there are no values. Quite the opposite. It is commitment to certain values, 
coupled with the idea that there is a looming threat of coming unmoored from these values. 
The “nihil” comes from the attendant condition of finding nothing valuable where there is 
actually something valuable. Where Nietzsche diﬀers from them is not in his account of what 
nihilism fundamentally  is  (i.e.,  coming  unmoored  from values),  but  in  the  values  he  sees 
nihilists  as  having  come  unmoored  from.  They  are  committed  to  Christian-moral  values. 
Nietzsche of course is not. It is no accident that moralists and Christians who know little 
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about Nietzsche, and his critique of nihilism, will describe him as a nihilist.  By the lights of 38
their values, Nietzsche is a nihilist. They and Nietzsche disagree not about what nihilism is, but 
about what values are most important. 
But is anyone right? Does Nietzsche himself think anyone is right? Or is it simply a 
clash of perspectives, none with any privilege or legitimacy? The closest view to the one I oﬀer 
here is presented by Richard Schacht, and he argues for an objectivist and monistic answer to 
these questions. Discussing Nietzsche’s analysis of nihilism, Schacht writes  “…[Nietzsche] is 
saying that Schopenhauer—and Plato,  and Christianity,  and the rest—have missed the true 
meaning of the earth; just as they have missed the fact that the enhancement of life is an 
absolute value, and is the only absolute value which does not rest upon illusion, but rather has 
an objective foundation, in the nature of life itself.”  The view I oﬀer here is in the same 39
direction, but one of its merits, I believe, is to rest independently of this sort of objectivism 
(i.e., value realism) and monism (i.e., there is one ultimate value), both of which are contentious 
on  philosophical  and  exegetical  grounds.  The  account  I  oﬀer  here  requires  simply  that 
Nietzsche has first-order normative commitments to a set of higher values. My claim in this 
paper is that these commitments are deeply implicated in his account of what nihilism is. 
VIII. Conclusion: 
Nihilism, in one form or another,  is  in the air  preceding Nietzsche. From Jacobi to 
Turgenev and Dostoevsky, and in a variety of other figures, it is seen as a looming crisis. But he 
gives an interestingly diﬀerent take on what this crisis involves by construing nihilism as not 
just a post-Christian phenomenon but a deeply Christian phenomenon as well. If we are not 
attentive to this drastic volte-face, we cannot hope to get Nietzsche’s account right. 
 Thanks to ____________ for noting this in conversation. 38
 Schacht (1973). 39
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It can look like everyone who disagrees with him about fundamental values is thereby a 
nihilist. Very few people agree with Nietzsche’s values in their entirety, and presumably not all 
of them are nihilists. It is important to remember that what I am oﬀering here is a unifying 
thread among forms of nihilism Nietzsche talks about. The goal is not to give us an analytical 
definition for dividing the world exhaustively into nihilists and non-nihilists, via necessary and 
suﬃcient conditions.  This was never Nietzsche’s concern, and it shouldn’t be ours either. It is 
rather to tell us, when it comes to those Nietzsche calls nihilists, about one philosophically-
illuminating (if admittedly, somewhat thin) feature they have in common. They share, on my 
reading, the ethical failing of having come unmoored from the most important values. That 
will help us to understand a core element of what their nihilism consists in. But it is not to say 
that everyone failing to value the valuable is thereby a nihilist. Various other features might be 
needed, perhaps in complex interrelations that will defy simple formulas. My point is that at 
least this particular feature is an important part of the story. Extant accounts, it is important to 
remember,  haven’t  even managed to give us  a  unifying thread,  let  alone a  more ambitious 
analysis of what sets nihilists and non-nihilists apart. 
Valuing, for Nietzsche, is an inescapable condition for human beings. The question is 
where these valuing energies are to be directed. With the aﬄiction of nihilism, one is failing, 
through ideology, depression, or philosophical commitment, of valuing important swaths of the 
valuable. Humanity has operated under this pernicious condition for two millennia, and the 
situation has gone from bad to worse, as Christianity has declined and the last man has become 
ascendant. Far from being idiosyncratic in this proposal, Nietzsche, it seems to me, gives a 
poignant diagnosis of the signal crisis of humanity, since Christianity took hold: It is not that 
the people cease to be valuing creatures; they always have been and always will be. It is that 
they, to some degree, have come unmoored from many of the most important values. By the 
time of the last man, this condition reaches disastrous proportions. 
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Some of the literature about Nietzsche on nihilism has left us with a misleading picture 
about how we might escape from its clutches. It has made it seem like a condition that we 
might escape so long as we retain suﬃciently committed and fanatical to something. But this is 
not enough. Such a reading stems from a misreading of the third essay of the Genealogy,  a 
misreading that misses one of its great ironies. By avoiding the dangerous prospect of “suicidal 
nihilism” through the ascetic ideal (GM, III:28), one does not, as mentioned earlier, escape 
nihilism, but simply trades one form of nihilism for another. If the lesson of Christianity has 
taught us anything, it matters what we are committed to. Christianity, in Nietzsche’s eyes, is 
surely better than many things, but it poisons as much as it protects. 
Nietzsche’s normative agenda, in light of which he levels these charges of nihilism, is of 
course highly contentious. For this reason, many readers of Nietzsche try to extract what they 
see as philosophically important, while seeking to bracket this controversial agenda as much as 
possible. This is, on one level, understandable, and it may be why formalist and psychologist 
approaches  have  been  so  popular.  For  who’s  to  say  that  Nietzsche  is  right  in  his  value 
commitments? Yet as exegesis, this seems to me the wrong approach, on this issue, and on a 
great  many  others.  Nietzsche’s  normative  agenda  cuts  very  deep;  without  it,  we  don’t 
understand what he was up to. 
But doesn’t this then leave Nietzsche’s analysis and critique of nihilism hostage to his 
own idiosyncratic, certainly overstated, and possibly false picture of what matters? What if we 
think Nietzsche is utterly wrong? Or mostly wrong? Or overstated? Or think, at least, that he 
has no grounds for claiming what he does? Can he get any traction on us? Should we pay any 
attention to him? I think we often miss what is most interesting and important in Nietzsche if 
we  try  to  shift  him onto  a  plane  where  his  objections  have  rational,  dialectical  bite.  For 
Nietzsche is more a philosopher of rhetoric than rational argument.  Many people,  in his 40
reckoning, are lost causes, for whom a life of illusion, continuing nihilism, or both, is the only 
 I agree very much with the contention in Janaway (2007) that Nietzsche is interested in reaching us at an 40
aﬀective level as well as at a rational one. 
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real option. But this is not true for all of us. Through singing songs of praise—his encomia 
sometimes so forced and desperate that they acquire almost a tragic air—he wants to redirect 
those of us who can be redirected back to this life and world, and to find the value that he 
thinks we have been missing there. In a rapturously beautiful Nietzschean turn of phrase in 
one of his letters, Rilke writes: “Not until we can make the abyss our dwelling-place will the 
paradise we have sent on ahead of us turn around and will everything deeply and fervently of 
the here-and-now, which the Church embezzled for the Beyond, come back to us; then all the 
angels will decide, singing praises, in favor of the earth.”  This is the life-aﬃrming perspective 41
Nietzsche wants to shift us toward, or to remind us to cherish. Some will not be able to bear 
this, and life-negating nihilism will, ironically, be more conducive to their continued happiness 
and survival. But to those of us who can shift, or have shifted, this is our salvation.  42
 Rilke, letter to Ilse Jahr, 22 Feb 1923. Rilke (1946 [1929]). 41
 My thanks to Ken Gemes for his comments on drafts of this paper, as well as to the participants in the Late 42
Modern Philosophy Workshop at Boston University and the Post-Kantian Receptions of the Enlightenment 
Conference in London.
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